The Positive Technologies incident response team (PT ESC IR) has discovered StingyBasilisk, a previously unknown APT group1 that conducted espionage within a government agency's IT infrastructure. The attackers maintained covert access to the agency's internal network for nearly four years, disguising their malicious tools as security software used by the organization.
The PT ESC IR team first identified StingyBasilisk in 2026 while investigating an incident at a government agency. The investigation revealed that the attackers had been active in the infrastructure since at least April 2022. Although the team could not determine the initial infection vector, it uncovered an extensive network of malware agents controlled through Windows named pipes.
Starting in February 2026, the group began actively expanding its foothold in the network. The attackers used SMB for lateral movement and Windows Task Scheduler for remote code execution. Their toolkit included SilentCOM, TediousLoader, and CunningDoor, all software modules that executed malicious code directly in the infected computer's memory.
The attackers used several tools and techniques to maintain covert persistence on compromised devices, including COM hijacking and Time Providers. COM hijacking allowed them to redirect references to legitimate Windows COM components, while the Time Providers technique involved registering a malicious DLL as a time provider for the Windows Time service (W32Time).