NewsPositive Technologies uncovers APT group behind years of espionage in a government agency's network
News

Positive Technologies uncovers APT group behind years of espionage in a government agency's network

The Positive Technologies incident response team (PT ESC IR) has discovered StingyBasilisk, a previously unknown APT group1 that conducted espionage within a government agency's IT infrastructure. The attackers maintained covert access to the agency's internal network for nearly four years, disguising their malicious tools as security software used by the organization.

The PT ESC IR team first identified StingyBasilisk in 2026 while investigating an incident at a government agency. The investigation revealed that the attackers had been active in the infrastructure since at least April 2022. Although the team could not determine the initial infection vector, it uncovered an extensive network of malware agents controlled through Windows named pipes.

Starting in February 2026, the group began actively expanding its foothold in the network. The attackers used SMB for lateral movement and Windows Task Scheduler for remote code execution. Their toolkit included SilentCOM, TediousLoader, and CunningDoor, all software modules that executed malicious code directly in the infected computer's memory.

The attackers used several tools and techniques to maintain covert persistence on compromised devices, including COM hijacking and Time Providers. COM hijacking allowed them to redirect references to legitimate Windows COM components, while the Time Providers technique involved registering a malicious DLL as a time provider for the Windows Time service (W32Time).

1 An advanced persistent threat (APT) group is an organized group of attackers that carries out sophisticated, targeted cyberattacks and seeks to maintain long-term, covert access to victims' systems.

"StingyBasilisk is one of the most sophisticated threats we have encountered in 2026. The group has a custom tool for covert remote control whose code is never written to disk. Our investigation found that the attackers had been inside the organization's internal network for 1,398 days before the incident was detected. This highlights the importance of looking for evidence of earlier activity during an investigation: the incident you uncover may be part of a campaign spanning years."

Daniil Grigoryan
Daniil GrigoryanLead Specialist on the PT ESC IR team

To reduce the risk of similar attacks, organizations should inventory their infrastructure and identify the systems whose compromise would cause the greatest harm. Domain controllers, centralized management servers, and other critical assets require particular attention. Organizations should strengthen access controls, keep these systems updated, and monitor their activity. They should also check their infrastructure for signs of compromise because attackers can remain undetected for extended periods by disguising their tools as legitimate software.